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Abstract 
The idea that the governance mechanisms affect firms’ performance is well acknowledged in 
management literature. The settings prevailing in governance studies explain board’s roles at 
the light of the agency theory framework. However, a complementary perspective is focused 
on the acquisition of critical resources closely related to activation of external relations with 
the most influential actors of firm’s environment. One such kind of external relationship is 
called interlocking directorates and occur when an individual simultaneously sits on the board 
of two companies. 
Moreover, since banks control financial capital, that is a resource that has a universal value 
for all firms, they are more likely to be very important actors inside corporate networks. 
By analyzing interlocking directorates among listed banks and non financial firms in Italy, 
using the methods and theory of social network analysis (SNA), I find that banks are the most 
influential actors in the network and that centrality in the network enhances financial 
performance. 
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Banks’ centrality in corporate interlock networks: evidences in Italy 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea that governance mechanisms affect firms’ performance is well acknowledged in 
management literature. Board of director (BoD) is one of the most important mechanisms of 
governance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Williamson, 1985; Mintzberg, 1983).  
According to Fama (1980), BoD “is viewed as a market induced institution, the ultimate 
internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most important role is to 
scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm”. 
The settings prevailing in governance studies explain BoD’s roles at the light of the agency 
and managerial theories framework (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Berle 
and Means, 1932). However, a complementary perspective is focused on the contingency 
concept and on the acquisition of critical resources closely related to activation of external 
relations with the most influential actors of firm’s environment. Grandori (1997) argues that 
governance mechanisms are bundled in specific ways to handle specific transactions and 
activities. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have stressed the notion of fit, typically among 
organizational and governance structures and environmental conditions.  
One such kind of external relationship is called interlocking directorates and occur when an 
individual simultaneously sits on the BoD of two companies (Mizruchi, 1996).  
Interlocking directorates have important implications for the structure and effective 
functioning of BoD, which in turn have an important role to play in corporate governance and 
company performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). In this sense, Yeo, Pochet and 
Alcouffe (2003) find a positive relationship between the number of CEOs reciprocal 
interlocks and their firms’ performance measured by ROA. 
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According to network literature (Uzzi, 1997; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973) 
and strategic management literature (Gnyawali, He and Madhavan, 2006; Echols and Tsai, 
2005; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 
2000; Gulati, 1999), not only the number of interlock but also the structure of these 
relationships could affect firms’ competitive behavior and performance.  
Following Mac Canna, Brennan and O’Higgins (1998), primary to the paper is the idea that 
the network of interlocking directorates among banks and other firms is structured and not the 
result of random processes. 
More in detail, the objective of this paper is to look at the incidence of interlocking 
directorates in Italian firms and to examine the effects of the structure of such interlocks on 
performance. By analyzing interlocking directorates among listed banks and non financial 
firms in Italy, using the methods and theory of social network analysis (SNA), this study aims 
to verify that banks are the most influential actors in the network and that centrality in the 
network enhances their financial performance.  
To my knowledge, this would be the first systematic study of the relationships among 
structure of interlocking directorates and performance in Italy. 
 
The study proceeds as follows.  
In the first section I develop theory and hypotheses. Following I outline my study setting and 
methodology, and present results. Finally, I present implications, limits and conclusions. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
The belief that the improvement of governance systems can contribute to increase corporate 
performance is an important condition for the study of BoDs. More and more importance is 
 4 
being given in literature to the study of the characteristics of BoDs and to the consequences of 
such characteristics in terms of overall performance. 
Several studies argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance depends to a large extent 
on  structures and on decisional mechanisms of BoDs (Carretta, Regalli and Schwizer, 2006; 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999;  Jensen, 1993; Provan, 1980; Mace, 1971).  
Structure and functioning of BoD are important topics, which have been vested, over the 
years, with increasingly broad and complex tasks, ranging from setting strategic development 
guidelines to guiding and supervising the performance of management. An unreliable BoD 
determines investor distrust and, consequently, the increased cost of capital.  
BoD, therefore, is an institution that can help to limit management-related agency problems, 
which primarily concern conflicts of interest between the ownership and the management of a 
business, and represents a key governance mechanism for making sure that the objectives of 
the shareholders and those of the management are kept in line (Freeman, 1984; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Over the years, however, a complementary perspective sees BoD in a systemic way, within a 
network of relations with the most influential actors of firm’s environment (Grandori and 
Carpani, 2004; Child and Rodriguez, 2003; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Levine, 1972). In this perspective, interlocking directorates can assume different 
meanings depending on the interpretive model (Bianco and Pagnoni, 1997):  
- managerial model; 
- class cohesion model;  
- control model;  
- financial capital model;  
- resource-dependency model.  
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From a managerial point of view, the autonomy between ownership and management implies 
that can not be attributed a particular mean to interlocking directorates since structural links 
between BoDs can in any way influence the decisions of management (Mace, 1971). 
According to the class cohesion model, however, interlocking directorates represent an 
instrument for the strengthening of class relationships aimed to the formation of a “corporate 
elite” (Scott, 2003).  
The control model sees the interlocking directorates as the result of a particular structure of 
the economic system at the heart of which lies an actor which exercises the control of the 
other actors, typically a bank.  
Furthermore, the model of financial capital recognizes the greater power of banks due to the 
greater control of financial capital flows within the belonging network (Mintz and Schwartz, 
1985; Levine, 1972). 
Finally, the resource-dependency model sees interlocking directorates aimed to the 
achievement of mutual interests for firms (Pennings, 1980), allowing the reinforcement of 
social capital and the access to knowledge circuits.  
If it is true that the need to activate relations grows when resource-dependency increases, then 
networking activity is a necessary relational strategy.  
According to Pfeffer (1972) interlocking directorates have at least the following benefits / 
implications: i) ties allow to establish relationships and alliances with other firms, ii) ties 
allow to acquire information on markets and competitors, iii) ties allow to have a privileged 
access to resources, iv) ties allow to face possible threats, iv) ties allow to influence the 
activities and the strategies of other firms. 
In particular, from banks’ perspective, if the enforcement of contracts is poor and obtaining 
information about borrowers is costly lending interlocking directorates are a way for banks to 
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reduce asymmetries of information and monitoring costs. From firms’ perspective, 
interlocking directorates could be useful in case of credit rationing and of limited substitutes 
for it. 
Theoretically, according to financial capital, control and resource-dependency perspectives, 
banks should have the higher power of influence than the other firms. Effectively, Allen 
(1974) observes that banks have more interlocking directorates compared with other firms. 
Moreover, Kotz (1978) states that banks, as shareholders and creditors, can exercise a 
significant influence in the decisions of the bodies of government of other firms. Furthermore, 
since resource-dependency becomes greater during the periods of crisis, it is in these moments 
that banks may play a central role in the decision-making of firms.  
However, Davis and Mizruchi (1999), through an analysis of comprehensive data on the 
BoDs of the fifty largest banks and their connections with the several hundred largest non-
bank corporations from 1982 to 1994, show that the centrality of banks has significantly 
declined during that period as consequence of banks’ strategic choices. 
Based on these arguments, it is possible that banks, by virtue of the greater control of 
environmental key resources, are the most central players in the network of interlocking 
directorates activated with the BoDs of other firms. Thus: 
   
H1: Banks are the most central players in the network of interlocking directorates formed 
with other firms.  
 
 
Could the greater centrality positively affect performance? If networks provide channels for 
the exchange of information and resources then central firms can use these channels to reach 
key information and resources that enhance, from one side, the knowledge about strategies 
 7 
and resources of competing firms, even in the absence of any asset flows (Harrigan, 1986) 
and, from the other side, power (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
Burt, 1980). 
Actors occupying central positions in a network are viewed as potentially powerful because of 
their greater access to and possible control over relevant resources and several studies have 
shown that differential access to network resources leads to different performance levels. A 
substantial body of literature has analyzed both the contingencies under which one network 
structure is more beneficial relative to the other (Burt, 2007; Soda, Usai and Zaheer, 2004; 
Ahuja, 2000; Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000; Podolny 1993) and the relations 
between firms’ network position (deriving from ties with other firms) and performance 
(Almeida, Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2003; Lee, Lee and Pennings, 2001; Powell, Koput, Smith-
Doerr and Owen-Smith, 1999; Stuart, 2000).  
In synthesis, relationships in a network are potential sources of firm internal resources 
(Langlois, 1992; Nohria, 1992), whose effectiveness is dependent by network structure (Burt, 
1992) and by internal capabilities (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Following, quality and 
relevance of information and resources deriving from favourable networks positions can 
improve a firm’s performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004). 
In fact, an important feature of network ties is that they operate as “pipelines” through which 
information’ and resources’ flows are exchanged among firms (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2004). The strategic contingencies and resource dependency frameworks (Hickson, Butler, 
Cray, Mallory and Wilson, 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) posit that power derives from 
the control of relevant resources. This concept of control by one single actor implies that 
others in the network have few alternative sources for acquiring the resource, such that the 
actor controls or mediates others’ access to the resource. 
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Centrality in the network is the extent to which an actor controls or is deeply involved in these 
network flows (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1980).  
If networks provide channels for the exchange of information and resources then central firms 
can use these channels to reach key information and resources that enhance, from one side, 
the knowledge about strategies and resources of competing firms, even in the absence of any 
asset flows (Harrigan, 1986) and, from the other side, power (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1980). 
Actors occupying central positions in a network are viewed as potentially powerful because of 
their greater access to and possible control over relevant resources (Boje and Whetten, 1981). 
Central firms enjoy advantages from network position also because their resource superiority 
reduces competitors’ likelihood of response (Chen, 1996) as less central competitors will find 
it more difficult and costly to give a response because their limited information set. In 
addition, since central competitors are more prestigious and more powerful, other firms are 
less likely to want to provoke them.  
In this sense, from a greater centrality should derive an increased possibility of controlling all 
potential flows of resources (e.g., information and capital) and an increased performance. 
Thus: 
 
H2: Bank’s performance is positively related to centrality. 
 
3. Data and variables 
The sample consists of all firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in 2006 with the 
exception of Expandi market (collectively relationships between 255 firms are analyzed).  
To verify the hypothesis H1 I used a sub-sample formed by listed banks and insurance 
companies. To verify the hypothesis H2 the former sub-sample was restricted to 30 banks 
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(without insurance companies). The analysis of the relationship between BoDs is based on the 
use of CONSOB’s data while the performance of banks was calculated using Bankscope’s 
data referred to year 2006.  
The analysis of the performance of banks is based on ROE and ROA measures, commonly 
used in literature (Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004; Molyneux, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2000; Berger, 1995).  
In addition, in order to measure banks’ power of influence (given by the centrality in the 
network of interlocking directorates), I used the technique of social network analysis 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Mitchell, 1969). Using a social network analysis software, 
UCINET VI (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002), I applied this technique in order to 
describe the structure of the network, through the following indicators: i) number of 
connections of each actor (degree) and ii) centrality of each actor in the network 
(betweenness). 
The degree of individual players in the network is important because it reveals the number of 
connections that are activated for each subject and, consequently, the size of individual 
relationships.  
However, the information on the degree is not in itself sufficient to determine the importance 
of the actors. To determine the importance of an actor in connecting other players in the 
network means, in fact, to analyze the degree of intervention, that is the frequency with which 
each actor is on the minimum path between other players.  
Betweenness refers to how often an actor in the network is the shortest route to reach the 
other players, regardless of the direction of the relationship (in or out). Betweenness for a 
given actor i is calculated to sum up the number of geodesic paths between two distinct 
actors, j and k that pass through i. Increasing the value given to the centrality measure also 
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increases the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to influence the interaction between the 
other players.  
 
4. Analysis 
Checking the hypothesis that banks are the most central players in the network of interlocking 
directorates among listed companies (H1) is based on the observation and the comparison of 
the indicators related to degree and betweenness. In particular, the hypothesis H1 is verified if 
degree and betweenness of banks and insurance companies are greater than degree and 
betweenness of the other firms. 
Checking the hypothesis that the performance of banks is positively influenced by the 
centrality in the network of reference (H2) is based on the construction of an appropriate 
model of analysis. In detail, following relations should be verified:  
 
(1) ROE = β0 + β1 L-_ASSET + β2 EQUIT_TA + β3 COSTI-CO + β4 CE-TRAL + ε 
 
(2) ROA = β0 + β1L-_ASSET + β2 COSTI-CO + β3 CE-TRAL + ε 
 
In the models it is identified: with the variable ROE the ratio between net income and equity; 
with the variable ROA the ratio between net income and total assets; with the variable 
LN_ASSET the logarithm of total assets, which expresses the size of the bank; with the 
variable EQUIT_TA the weight of equity on total assets (book value), which is an indicator of 
the bank’s financial leverage (adequacy of capital); with the variable COSTINCO the level of 
efficiency of the bank; with the variable CENTRAL the degree of centrality (betweenness) of 
the bank. In response, hypothesis H2 is verified if: 
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- in model 1, coefficient β4 is positive and statistically significant;  
- in model 2, the coefficient β3 is positive and statistically significant. 
 
5. Results 
Following figure shows the graphic representation of the network structure for the 255 firms 
listed in Italian Stock Exchange (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 – -etwork structure 
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The hypothesis H1 is verified as banks and insurance companies are characterized by a 
greater number of connections and by a superior centrality.  
In particular, the degree of individual players in the network shows how banks are connected 
to a larger number of actors (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 – Degree 
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Degree of banks and insurance companies is also due to the greater BoD size and to the larger 
presence of BoD members with more than one appointment (Figures 3 and 4). 
 
Figure 3 – BoD members 
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Figure 4 - BoD members with appointments in other BoDs 
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However, in order to verify the importance of the actors in connecting other players in the 
network, it should also be analyzed the frequency with which each actor is on the minimum 
path between other actors (betweenness). Even in this case, banks are, on average, in the 
shortest route to reach the other players. This high level of centrality shows a greater ability to 
influence interactions in the network. This role may get greater importance in the network 
because warrants, in the relational space, the ability to control resources and the possibility to 
connect subgroups (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 – Betweenness 
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Moreover, the regression models 1 and 2 seem to confirm (even if only partially, since in the 
model 1 β4 is positive but not significant) the hypothesis H2 on the existence of a relationship 
among centrality and banks’ financial performance.  
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations and correlations among variables included in the 
analysis. 
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Table 1 - Mean, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 
ROE 11,6 8,168907      
ROA 1,067333 0,989563 0,629914     
LN_ASSET 16,96624 1,671506 -0,13908 -0,42716    
COSTINCO 62,9 19,71408 -0,40752 -0,63431 0,152377   
EQUIT_TA 0,109936 0,147926 -0,19476 0,539542 -0,30335 -0,55152  
CENTRAL 156,6 195,252 0,151621 0,348257 0,064285 -0,21415 0,269431 
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The summary information relating to the models 1 and 2 are shown in the following table 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 2 – Regression results 
 ROE 
 (Model 1) 
ROA 
 (Model 2) 
 
Variables 
 
Coefficients 
 
VIF 
 
Coefficients 
 
VIF 
 
LN_ASSET 
-1,2902** 
(0,730) 
1,129991 -0,21556** 
(,077) 
1,034194 
 
COSTINCO 
-0,30078** 
(0,070) 
1,446826 -0,02626** 
(,007) 
1,079423 
 
EQUIT_TA 
-0,40415** 
(9,890) 
1,626359   
 
CENTRAL 
0,0088  
(0,006) 
1,11335 0,001316* 
(0,001) 
1,058736 
Constant 55,47384** 
(13,628) 
 6,170626** 
(1,305) 
 
Size of the sample 30 30 
R
 0,507 0,578 
R
2
 Adjusted 0,428 0,529 
F Statistic 6,426** 11,863** 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
In model 1, the coefficient of the variable CENTRAL, although positive, is not very 
significant and therefore it is impossible to fully confirm the original hypothesis (H2).  
The coefficients of the other explanatory variables for the model 1 are, however, all 
significant at the level of 5% and the signs are consistent with expectations.  
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The value R
2
 adjusted for the model 1 is 0,428 while the F statistic is 6,426 and confirms the 
significance of the model. The values reported for the statistic Variance Inflaction Factor 
(VIF) indicate the absence of multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables of the 
model 1.  
In model 2, the coefficient on the variable CENTRAL is positive and significant at the 10% 
level and this confirms the original hypothesis (H2). As in the case of model 1 also 
coefficients for the other explanatory variables considered for the model 2 are all significant 
at the 5% level and the signs are consistent with expectations.  
The value R
2
 adjusted for this model is 0,529 while the F statistic is equal to 11,863. Finally, 
the values of the statistic Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) indicate in this case, the absence of 
multi-collinearity between explanatory variables. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This study gives a contribution to governance literature by investigating the relations of 
influence in the Italian corporate network and their effects on performance and results shows 
favourable evidences for banks. In further detail I suggest a systemic vision of governance 
that sees firms not as isolated individuals but as actors belonging to a network of relationships 
that contribute to define governance mechanisms. 
By considering the social processes that underlie the formation of interlocking directorates 
among banks and other firms I examined performance’s consequences for banks in terms of 
opportunities that they can extract from their network-building activities. Results provide 
evidence that banks benefit from their positions within networks. 
Based on the assumption that the power depends not only by the number of connections 
activated but also by the quality, these results show how the centrality in the network gives a 
positive and significant contribution to the performance in financial industry.  
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Moreover, according to financial capital, control and resource-dependency perspectives, the 
relationships between banks and other firms are characterized mainly by the firms’ 
dependence on banks since they are greater control of financial capital.  
In greater detail, two evidences can be observed: i) banks are actually the players which hold 
the greater power of influence in the network of interlocking directorates formed with other 
firms; ii) the contribution given by the quality of network ties on the overall performance of 
banks is positive and significant. 
However, this study has several limitations.  
First, I concentrate only on one type of interorganizational relations but the analysis of the 
Italian corporate network should be enriched by adding data about ownership ties and other 
relations (supplier relations, customer relations, etc.) among banks and firms.  
Second, rather than taking a snapshot of the Italian corporate network in 2006, it would be 
preferable to study its evolution a larger period.  
Finally, although the primary focus of my analysis was effects of network position on banking 
performance, other important questions could be raised. In particular, an interesting area for 
future research is the way through which changes that occur in competitive environment 
determine changes of banks’ position in corporate network. 
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Appendix 
 
-. -ame Degree Betweenness 
1 ACEA 6 262 
2 ACEGAS 2 0 
3 ACOTEL 1 0 
4 ACQUE POTABILI 3 0 
5 ACSM 1 0 
6 ACTELIOS 6 368 
7 AEDES 9 176 
8 AEM 4 69 
9 AEROPORTO DI FIRENZE 5 97 
10 AEROPORTO VENEZIA 2 16 
11 ALERION 14 853 
12 ALGOL 0 0 
13 ALITALIA 1 0 
14 ALLEANZA ASSICURAZIONI 13 965 
15 AMGA 6 380 
16 AMPLIFON 4 28 
17 ANIMA SGR 3 34 
18 ANSALDO STS 1 0 
19 ARNOLDO MONDADORI EDITORE 4 13 
20 ART’E 1 0 
21 ASM BRESCIA 8 282 
22 AS ROMA 0 0 
23 GENERALI 15 684 
24 ASTALDI 2 0 
25 AUTOGRIL 16 613 
26 AUTOSTRADA TORINO MILANO 3 8 
27 AUTOSTRADE SPA 18 963 
28 AZIENDA ENERGETICA METROPOLITANA TORINO 0 0 
29 AZIMUT 0 0 
30 CARIGE 2 0 
31 FIDEURAM 8 447 
32 BANCA FINNAT 7 174 
33 BANCA IFIS 0 0 
34 BANCA INTERMOBILIARE DI INVESTIMENTI E GESTIONI  6 47 
35 BANCA INTESA 9 223 
36 BANCA ITALEASE 4 210 
37 BANCA LOMBARDA E PIEMONTESE SPA 7 254 
38 BANCA MPS 5 139 
39 BNL 16 1.019 
40 BANCA PICCOLO CREDITO VALTELLINESE SOCIETA’ COOPERATIVA 3 4 
41 BANCA POPOLARE DELL’ETRURIA E DEL LAZIO  0 0 
42 BANCA POPOLARE DI INTRA SOCIETA’ COOPERATIVA PER AZIONI 1 0 
43 BPM 2 11 
44 BANCABANCA POPOLARE DI SPOLETO SPA   1 0 
45 BPI 1 0 
46 BANCA PROFILO 0 0 
47 BPU 2 18 
48 BANCO DI DESIO E DELLA BRIANZA SPA 6 68 
49 BANCO DI SARDEGNA SPA 2 67 
50 BPVN 1 0 
51 BASIC NET 3 17 
52 BASTOGI 0 0 
53 BEGHELLI 6 110 
54 BENETTON 16 449 
55 BENI STABILI 3 151 
56 BIESSE 2 10 
57 BIPIELLE INVESTIMENTI 6 462 
58 BOERO BARTOLOMEO 0 0 
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-. -ame Degree Betweenness 
59 BONIFICA TERRENI FERRARESI E IMPRESE AGRICOLE SPA   2 15 
60 BREMBO 5 21 
61 BRIOSCHI FINANZIARIA 0 0 
62 BULGARI 1 0 
63 BUONGIORNO VITAMINIC 2 0 
64 BUZZI UNICEM 5 58 
65 CAD IT 0 0 
66 CAIRO COMMUNICATION 1 0 
67 CALTAGIRONE EDITORE 8 516 
68 CALTAGIRONE SPA 6 31 
69 CAMFIN CAM FINANZIARIA SPA 15 607 
70 CAPITALIA 13 190 
71 CARRARO 8 14 
72 CASSA RISPARMIO FIRENZE 8 438 
73 CDB WEB TECH SPA 7 61 
74 CDC POINT 2 31 
75 CEMBRE SPA 0 0 
76 CEMENTIR 5 0 
77 CENTRALE LATTE TORINO 4 79 
78 CHL 0 0 
79 CICCOLELLA 0 0 
80 CIR 10 169 
81 CLASS EDITORI 0 0 
82 COFIDE 9 176 
83 CREDITO ARTIGIANO 6 292 
84 CREDITO BERGAMASCO 5 81 
85 CREDITO EMILIANO 3 13 
86 CREMONINI 0 0 
87 CSP - INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIE CALZE  0 0 
88 DADA 3 0 
89 DANIELI 2 57 
90 DATALOGIC 6 252 
91 DATAMAT 0 0 
92 DATA SERVICE SPA 7 161 
93 DAVIDE CAMPARI - MILANO  6 88 
94 DE LONGHI SPA 8 165 
95 DIGITAL BROS SPA 0 0 
96 DMAIL GROUP SPA 0 0 
97 DMT DIGITAL MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES SPA 0 0 
98 DUCATI MOTOR HOLDING SPA 8 144 
99 EDISON SPA 7 351 
100 EEMS ITALIA SPA 0 0 
101 EL.EN. SPA 3 9 
102 EMAK SPA 0 0 
103 ENEL 3 40 
104 ENERTAD SPA 4 204 
105 ENGINEERING 0 0 
106 ENI 9 106 
107 ERGO PREVIDENZA 4 0 
108 ERG 1 0 
109 ESPRINET 0 0 
110 EUPHON 1 0 
111 EUROFLY 0 0 
112 EUROTECH 1 0 
113 EUTELIA 0 0 
114 EXPRIVIA 1 0 
115 FASTWEB 7 105 
116 FIAT 15 740 
117 FIDIA 0 0 
118 FIERA DI MILANO 1 0 
119 FILATURA DI POLLONE 0 0 
120 FINARTE 1 0 
121 FINMECCANICA 6 403 
122 FONDIARIA SAI 12 551 
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-. -ame Degree Betweenness 
123 FULLSIX 3 20 
124 GABETTI 3 222 
125 GARBOLI 0 0 
126 GEFRAN 4 196 
127 GEMINA 6 161 
128 GEOX 0 0 
129 GEWISS 5 48 
130 GIM SPA - GENERALE INDUSTRIE METALLURGICHE 13 612 
131 GIOVANNI CRESPI SPA 0 0 
132 GRANITIFIANDRE SPA  4 0 
133 GRUPPO CERAMICHE RICCHETTI SPA 1 0 
134 GRUPPO COIN 0 0 
135 GRUPPO EDITORIALE L’ESPRESSO SPA   15 656 
136 GUALA CLOSURES SPA 4 22 
137 HERA SPA (HOLDING ENERGIA RISORSE AMBIENTE) 5 146 
138 IFIL 8 77 
139 IFI 12 280 
140 IGD IMMOBILIARE GRANDE DISTRIBUZIONE SPA 1 0 
141 I GRANDI VIAGGI SPA 0 0 
142 I.M.A. INDUSTRIA MACCHINE AUTOMATICHE SPA   1 0 
143 IMMOBILIARE LOMBARDA SPA 4 185 
144 IMMSI SPA 12 450 
145 IMPREGILO 7 333 
146 INDESIT 15 938 
147 INET 1 0 
148 INTEK SPA 4 16 
149 INTERPUMP GROUP SPA 14 473 
150 INVESTIMENTI & SVILUPPO SPA 3 39 
151 IPI SPA 6 65 
152 IRCE SPA - INDUSTRIA ROMAGNOLA CONDUTTORI ELETTRICI 0 0 
153 ISAGRO SPA 3 137 
154 ITALCEMENTI SPA FABBRICHE RIUNITE CEMENTO 16 879 
155 ITALJOLLY SPA - COMPAGNIA ITALIANA DEI JOLLY HOTELS 5 195 
156 ITALMOBILIARE SPA   9 241 
157 IT HOLDING SPA 1 0 
158 ITWAY SPA 0 0 
159 I VIAGGI DEL VENTAGLIO SPA 0 0 
160 JUVENTUS FOOTBALL CLUB SPA 8 166 
161 KAITECH SPA 0 0 
162 KME GROUP SPA 6 94 
163 LA DORIA SPA 0 0 
164 LA GAIANA SPA 1 0 
165 LAVORWASH SPA 1 0 
166 LINIFICIO E CANAPIFICIO NAZIONALE SPA 6 113 
167 LOTTOMATICA SPA 5 240 
168 LUXOTTICA GROUP SPA 15 582 
169 MAFFEI SPA 4 0 
170 MARAZZI GROUP SPA 5 65 
171 MARCOLIN SPA  11 834 
172 MARIELLA BURANI FASHION GROUP SPA 0 0 
173 MARR SPA 0 0 
174 MANIFATTURA LANE GAETANO MARZOTTO & FIGLI 11 300 
175 MEDIASET SPA 10 385 
176 MEDIOBANCA SPA 24 1.062 
177 MEDIOLANUM SPA 9 180 
178 MEDITERRANEA DELLE ACQUE SPA 3 0 
179 MELIORBANCA SPA  9 786 
180 MILANO ASSICURAZIONI SPA 10 389 
181 MIRATO SPA 2 0 
182 MITTEL SPA 6 158 
183 MONRIF SPA 3 8 
184 MONTEFIBRE SPA 0 0 
185 NAVIGAZIONE MONTANARI SPA 1 0 
186 NEGRI BOSSI SPA 4 0 
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-. -ame Degree Betweenness 
187 NICE SPA 2 185 
188 OLIDATA SPA 0 0 
189 PAGNOSSIN SPA 1 0 
190 PANARIAGROUP INDUSTRIE CERAMICHE SPA 1 0 
191 PARMALAT SPA 9 850 
192 PARTECIPAZIONI ITALIANE SPA 4 40 
193 PERMASTEELISA SPA 4 154 
194 PININFARINA SPA  4 47 
195 PIRELLI & C. REAL ESTATE SPA 10 319 
196 PIRELLI & C. SPA 32 2.542 
197 POLIGRAFICA S. FAUSTINO SPA 2 0 
198 POLIGRAFICI EDITORIALE SPA 6 56 
199 PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA SPA HOLDING DI PARTECIPAZIONI  11 342 
200 PREMUDA SPA 2 19 
201 PRIMA INDUSTRIE SPA 2 0 
202 RAS HOLDING SPA 20 875 
203 RATTI SPA 0 0 
204 RCS MEDIAGROUP SPA 25 1.313 
205 RECORDATI SPA - INDUSTRIA CHIMICA E FARMACEUTICA 5 184 
206 RENO DE MEDICI SPA 4 21 
207 REPLY SPA 2 0 
208 RETELIT SPA 5 36 
209 RETI BANCARIE SPA 1 0 
210 RICHARD GINORI 1735 SPA 1 0 
211 RISANAMENTO SPA 9 235 
212 RONCADIN SPA 0 0 
213 SABAF SPA 2 14 
214 SADI SPA 1 0 
215 SAES GETTERS SPA 5 196 
216 SAFILO GROUP SPA 3 3 
217 SAIPEM SPA 1 0 
218 SANPAOLO IMI SPA 7 422 
219 SARAS SPA RAFFINERIE SARDE 6 92 
220 SCHIAPPARELLI 1824 SPA 2 0 
221 SEAT PAGINE GIALLE SPA 10 306 
222 SIAS - SOCIETA’ INIZIATIVE AUTOSTRADALI E SERVIZI SPA 4 26 
223 SIRTI SPA 9 403 
224 SMURFIT SISA SPA 0 0 
225 SNAI SPA 0 0 
226 SNAM RETE GAS SPA 1 0 
227 SNIA SPA 4 37 
228 SOCIETA’ CATTOLICA DI ASSICURAZIONE SCARL 3 9 
229 SOCIETA` SPORTIVA LAZIO SPA 0 0 
230 SOCOTHERM SPA 0 0 
231 SOGEFI SPA 4 0 
232 SOL SPA 0 0 
233 SO.PA.F. SPA - SOCIETA’ DI PARTECIPAZIONI FINANZIARIE 5 150 
234 SORIN SPA 7 129 
235 STEFANEL SPA 3 7 
236 TARGETTI SANKEY SPA 0 0 
237 TAS TECNOLOGIA AVANZATA DEI SISTEMI SPA 5 0 
238 TELECOM ITALIA MEDIA SPA  12 530 
239 TELECOM ITALIA SPA 21 794 
240 TERNA - RETE ELETTRICA NAZIONALE SPA 5 233 
241 TISCALI SPA 2 2 
242 TOD’S SPA 8 197 
243 TORO ASSICURAZIONI SPA 7 238 
244 TREVI - FINANZIARIA INDUSTRIALE SPA 2 0 
245 TREVISAN COMETAL SPA 0 0 
246 TXT E-SOLUTIONS SPA 3 0 
247 UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA 10 318 
248 UNI LAND SPA 3 0 
249 UNIPOL SPA - COMPAGNIA ASSICURATRICE UNIPOL 4 60 
250 VALENTINO FASHION GROUP SPA 14 822 
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-. -ame Degree Betweenness 
251 VEMER SIBER GROUP SPA 0 0 
252 VIANINI INDUSTRIA SPA 5 0 
253 VIANINI LAVORI SPA 5 0 
254 VITTORIA ASSICURAZIONI SPA  12 652 
255 ZUCCHI SPA - VINCENZO ZUCCHI 4 41 
 
